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Infrastructure projects are often technically complicated 
and highly customized. Therefore, procurement 
competition tends to be limited. Competition is the 
single most important factor toward auction efficiency 
and anti-corruption. However, the degree of competition 
realized is closely related to bidders’ entry decision and 
the auctioneer’s decision on how to assess technical 
attributes in the bid evaluation process. This paper 
estimates the interactive effects among quality, entry, and 
competition. With data on procurement auctions for 
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electricity projects in developing countries, it is found 
that large electricity works are by nature costly and can 
attract only a few participants. The limited competition 
would raise government procurement costs. In addition, 
high technical requirements are likely to be imposed for 
these large-scale projects, which will in turn add extra 
costs for the better quality of works and further limit 
bidder participation. The evidence suggests that quality 
is of particular importance in large infrastructure projects 
and auctioneers cannot easily substitute price for quality.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
 
Infrastructure procurement is still a challenging task for governments, not only because 
public works are expensive, but also because the nature of the works is often highly 
complicated and customized. Competitive bidding became prevalent among public 
procurement systems throughout the world, but how to design the auction mechanism 
remains difficult in practice, especially when bidder participation is endogenously 
determined. Typical are large-scale electricity projects. Governments or public entities, 
namely auctioneers, may be able to increase or decrease the number of bidders at will, but at 
certain expense.  
 
The endogeneity of bidder participation is a complex issue in auction theory as well as its 
applications. As is well known, competition is the single most important factor toward 
achieving economic efficiency and anti-corrupt allocation of an object through competitive 
bidding. Even in the traditional fixed-n approach where the number of bidders is assumed 
fixed and commonly known by bidders, the equilibrium bid is expected to decrease with 
competition.
1 In the infrastructure procurement, it is of particular concern that the realized 
degree of competition is often limited, regardless of whether it is contracted out through a 
traditional method or public-private partnership (PPP) arrangement (e.g., Foster, 2005; NOA, 
2007; Estache and Iimi, 2008a).
2  
 
Estache and Iimi (2008a) confirm the importance of intensifying competition to contain 
infrastructure procurement costs, but in a static sense. The previous analysis presumes that 
                                                 
1 In the following sections of this paper, a government procurement auction is considered unless otherwise 
mentioned. Thus, bidder’s cost of procuring the contracted-out work is a piece of unknown private information. 
The best contractor is a firm with the lowest possible cost parameter.  
2 According to the Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI) database, the top 10 percent largest firms—
defined by the number of transactions that each company obtained—were awarded about half of total 
infrastructure PPP contracts.    - 3 -
the number of bidding firms is fixed.
3 In many applications, however, a number of firms 
would potentially be interested in an object to be auctioned at the initial stage, but may not 
always enter that auction after all. Why? This question cannot be addressed in the traditional 
standard auction literature focusing on comparison of auctioneer’s revenue between different 
institutions, but may be the center of interest of most auction practitioners. 
 
There are two main reasons, though closely related to one another: entry cost and quality 
threshold. First, entry may be costly for firms. If a fixed positive cost is required for 
participating in an auction, bidders will enter until their expected profits are driven to the 
entry cost. At this level no more firms can expect nonnegative profits from new entry. High 
entry costs would reduce the optimal number of bidders and raise the profit guaranteed for a 
bidder with the lowest possible valuation or the highest possible procurement cost in the 
public work procurement context (McAfee and McMillan, 1987). Similarly, Levin and Smith 
(1994) find a mixed strategy equilibrium composed of the entry probability, which is also a 
decreasing function of entry costs.
4 Under the circumstances where bidders decide whether 
to bid without knowing how many other rivals would participate, there is a clear tradeo
between the entry and competition effects when the number of potential bidders increases 
(Menezes and Monteiro, 2000). On one hand, intense competition is expected to induce 
bidders to reveal their true valuations, improving efficiency and reducing the equilibrium bid. 
On the other hand, enhanced competition would reduce the probability of each bidder’s 
winning the object and thus his expected profit. Then, the realized number of contenders may 
become small, resulting in higher bid prices. Accordingly, auctioneer’s expected revenue 
may or may not increase even if potential competition is augmented.  
ff 
                                                
 
 
3 From the empirical point of view, the fixed-n approach may not be inconsistent with the institutional setting of 
official development procurement, in which the number of bidders who were prequalified and actually 
participated in price competition is normally known among bidders prior to bidding.  
4 Unlike McAfee and McMillan (1987), Levin and Smith (1994) explicitly models who would enter the auction. 
Hence, in equilibrium each bidder would decide whether or not to participate, i.e., q
*, given a stochastic number 
of participating bidders, n.    - 4 -
The second reason for prospective bidders not participating is the presence of quality 
thresholds. Auctioneers often require participants to meet certain requirements prior to 
bidding, which may not be easy for some potential bidders to fulfill. In public infrastructure 
procurements, the main objective of requiring certain prerequisites, such as past experiences 
and managerial resources, from bidders is to ensure that the good quality of an object or 
public work be delivered at the agreed (lowest) cost within the designated period. Common 
practices are prequalification and other staged technical evaluation. Every aspect of 
“quality,” which refers to anything the auctioneer cares about other than bid prices, makes 
the auction mechanism much complicated. The theory of multidimensional auctions shows 
that the two-stage bid evaluation system can implement the optimal mechanism maximizing 
auctioneer’s expected profits (Che, 1993; Cripps and Ireland, 1994).
5 Prequalification is also 
expected to contribute to fostering a solid competitive marketplace, because well-qualified 
firms can price their bids with the knowledge that they are competing against only adequately 
qualified bidders with minimum competence criteria (ADB, 2006). However, a crucial 
shortcoming of multidimensional auctions is that the award process would be less transparent 
and more vulnerable to corruption; authorities can easily exploit their excessive discretion 
(Klein, 1998; Estache et al., 2008).  
 
There is little consideration of the entry problem in the multidimensional auction context. In 
reality, the auctioneer’s decision on whether to adopt such multidimensional methods may be 
dependent on how many bidders are expected to participate in the competitive bidding as 
well as the nature and technical complexity of public contracts. Highly specific qualification 
requirements would scale down the competition effect. Too rigid conditions might be 
considered an indication of corruption (Ware et al., 2007). Of course, firms can overcome 
their resource constraints, for instance, by pooling individual financial and experiential 
resources and making a bidding coalition. But whether joint bidding is pro- or anti-
                                                 
5 However, sequencing the price competition and the quality qualification makes no difference. The expected 
outcomes are the same regardless of whether quality or price is first examined, or even simultaneously (Cripps 
and Ireland, 1994).    - 5 -
competitive is also another controversial issue in auction theory.
6 Related to this, another 
alleged concern is that prequalification would rather help potential firms communicate and 
collude with each other. The prequalification stage certainly encourages firms to form joint 
ventures with other local or international firms, thereby benefiting from their resources and 
experience (ADB, 2006). At the same time, however, it may also provide many opportunities 
to facilitate communication among firms toward a collusive agreement.
7  
 
In principle, setting a quality threshold has three effects on the equilibrium bid. If quality is 
costly to produce and deliver, the equilibrium bid should increase. This is the true value 
attached to the required better quality of projects. Second, if quality is also costly to prepare, 
adding extra costs to potential contractors, the optimal number of bidders that are allowed to 
enter would decline in the presence of increased entry costs, whence limiting competition and 
raising the equilibrium bid. Third, however, if fewer bidders participate in an auction, the 
auctioneer may have an incentive to loosen the quality threshold as long as she values both 
bid price and quality. Under limited competition, quality may be subordinate to competition.
8 
Hence, the optimal quality threshold maximizing auctioneer’s expected profit might be 
relatively low. But lower thresholds would attract more bidders in turn. The total impact will 
be indeterminate and must be of necessity dependent on auctioneer’s quality preference (see 
the Annex for a simple example).  
 
Because of these interactive effects among quality, entry and competition, the following 
empirical analysis adopts the treatment effect, instrumental variable, two-stage probit least 
                                                 
6 For detailed discussion, see the joint bidding literature, such as Hendricks and Porter (1992), Krishna and 
Morgan (1997), Moody and Kruvant (1988) and Cho et al. (2002). In the infrastructure procurement context, 
Estache and Iimi (2008b) shows that joint bidding practices are largely incompatible with competition policy, 
except for a few cases, such as bidding coalition between local and foreign firms in road projects.  
7 In theory, bidders’ free communication may lead to their voluntary bidding coalitions (specifically, two large 
joint ventures under the common value paradigm), though they remain competitive (Cho et al., 2002). The 
empirical literature suggests that more communication among a fixed set of players, particularly when they 
reside in close geographic proximity, would likely facilitate collusive practices (e.g., Porter and Zona, 1999; 
Gupta, 2002; Price, 2008).  
8 Conversely, if a number of prospective firms are expected to participate, the auctioneer may prefer to request 
for higher qualities with little worry about possibly weakening competition.    - 6 -
squares, and three-stage least squares estimation methods. The remaining paper is organized 
as follows: Section II describes our data on public procurement auctions from official 
development assistance (ODA) financed infrastructure projects. It aims to overview the 
relationship between these elements on an informal basis. Section III develops our formal 
empirical models to estimate the equilibrium bid function with possible endogeneity of entry 
and quality considerations. Section IV presents and interprets our main empirical results.  
 
 
II. AN OVERVIEW OF ELECTRICITY PROJECT PROCUREMENT AUCTIONS: COMPETITION, 
ENTRY AND QUALITY  
 
Competition in public procurement auctions for infrastructure development is generally 
limited (Gupta, 2002; Foster, 2005). A fundamental reason is that a relatively small number 
of contractors are competent to participate in the competitive bidding for technically complex 
infrastructure projects. Classic are electricity projects. Normally, only two or three 
multinational enterprises may be able to make an entry to the selection process for large-scale 
electricity projects. Even in the road sector, which is deemed as relatively less complicated 
than other infrastructure sectors, the number of auction participants appears low at about 5 to 
6 (Estache and Iimi, 2008a). In our sample composed of 44 electricity project auctions with 
131 bids assisted by international aid donors, the average number of bidders is 4.7 with a 
median of 4 (Figure 1).  
 



















Source: Author’s calculation.    - 7 -
 
The distribution of the observed bids normalized to their engineering cost estimates is 
roughly bell-shaped with a slightly thick tail on the left hand side. Most bids centered to 
unity as usual. However, some bids are about half of the normative engineering costs, and 
others are far more above the cost estimates (Figure 2). As expected in theory, intensifying 
competition is of particular importance to contain infrastructure procurement costs at the 
auction level. Even on a simple correlation basis, there is a weak tendency toward lower bids, 
i.e., procurement costs, as the number of competitors increases (Figure 3).
9 However, as 
shown, the majority of auctions attracted less than seven bidders. In such cases, the 
competition effect may remain debatable.
10  
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Source: Author’s calculation. 
 
                                                 
9 It is arguable whether each empirical auction is characterized as the independent private value or common 
value paradigm. In theory, they may lead to much different bidding patterns (e.g., Milgrom and Weber, 1982). 
Especially, in the latter setting, competition may increase the equilibrium bid due to the winner’s curse effect 
(e.g., Paarsch, 1992; Klemperer, 1998; Hong and Shum, 2002; Athias and Nunez, 2006). In reality, any 
empirical auction may have both symmetric and asymmetric uncertainties for bidders. However, our belief is 
that in the ODA-related infrastructure procurements, auction-specific asymmetric uncertainty among bidders 
plays a relatively important role to determine the individual bid prices, whence in favor of choosing the 
independent private value paradigm. Typical are labor costs of individual firms. Even though the same amount 
of inputs is required to implement a project, unit costs (e.g., wages and equipment prices) are different across 
firms (Bajari et al., 2006). Also those private cost factors remain different across bidders even after the contract 
is awarded. By contrast, political instability and regulatory credibility are considered commonly uncertain 
components, which often matter to the public-private partnership (PPP) infrastructure auctions. However, for 
our traditional ODA project auctions to procure only specific construction works or equipment, those common 
factors are relatively less important than firm individual cost parameters. And Figure 3 and the following 
empirical analysis are suggestive, though not conclusive, evidence for a private value framework.  
10 For further detailed analysis, see Estache and Iimi (2008a).    - 8 -


















































Source: Author’s calculation. 
 
One of the main reasons for limited competition in power project procurements is that the 
objects to be sold tend to be highly valuable and fewer companies would be able to 
implement such large projects. Our data are supportive of this. For pecuniarily small 
contracts the number of participating bidders can be small and large, but only a few 
companies seem to be able to enter into large projects (Figure 4). However, this does not 
explain all. Closely related to the size issue, requiring certain “quality” standards from 
prospective bidders is crucially affecting firms’ entry decision. Of particular note, however, it 
is empirically difficult to quantify the way technical aspects are evaluated throughout the 
bidding process, because of high project specificity. Required criteria differ from project to 
project. Nonetheless, we can observe whether executing agencies adopted the auction 
mechanisms to account for other attributes than bid prices in the bid evaluation process. 
Under the prequalification process, only bidders who meet basic financial, technical and 
experiential criteria are allowed to bid. In the two-envelope procedure, all potential bidders 
are requested to submit both price and technical proposal and an auctioneer opens the price 
bids only if the submitted technical proposal meets the required standards. In practice, there 
are wide variations of such these staged approaches. Even if prequalification or two-envelope 
is not formally adopted, large-scale infrastructure development projects usually rely on some 
staged evaluation process to disqualify incompetent applicants, regardless of their offered 
prices.  
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Source: Author’s calculation. 
 
In our sample, 29 out of 44 electricity procurements were embedded with some auction 
mechanisms assessing technical elements substantially prior to price comparison. It is not 
surprising because electricity projects are complicated and need high technical capabilities 
from contractors. The figure includes the traditional two-envelope procedure and other staged 
process where bidders’ substantial responsiveness is evaluated first. In many cases, financial 
and experiential responsiveness is checked, and technical scores are calculated based on 
bidders’ proposals. At that stage, price bids may or may not be opened.
11 But if a bidder is 
disqualified due to technical reasons, his price bid will not be taken into consideration 
regardless of how much it is. Our sample reveals that the introduction of technical 
assessment would likely reduce the average number of bidders from 4.9 to 4.6. And the 
normalized average bid is higher when technical thresholds are established (Table 1). 
Nonetheless, the probability distributions of normalized bids show a mixed picture; relatively 
low bids look rather aggressive even with technical requirements imposed, possibly because 
of various interactive effects among competition, entry, quality and costs (Figure 5). This 
will be explored in the following sections.  
 
Table 1. Competition, Price Bids and Quality Evaluation  
Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min Max Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Number of bidders 15 4.93 2.89 2 12 29 4.59 3.67 2 18
Normalized bid 43 0.95 0.23 0.44 1.43 88 1.18 0.58 0.40 3.81
Without technical evaluation With technical evaluation
 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
                                                 
11 In the typical two-envelope procedure, price bids are not opened until the technical evaluation is finished.    - 10 -
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Source: Author’s calculation. 
 
 
III. ESTIMATION METHODS AND DATA  
 
Following the above discussion, to deal with endogeneity a system of three simultaneous 
reduced form equations is considered.
12 First, the symmetric equilibrium bid of bidder i at 
auction j (denoted by bij) is assumed a function of firms’ cost parameters for that work 
(which are captured by observable project attributes Xj and bidder-specific characteristics Yi), 
the presence of substantive technical evaluation (D
TE) and the number of realized bidders (nj). 
This follows the traditional empirical auction literature (e.g., Porter and Zona, 1993; Gupta, 
2002; Iimi, 2006). Notably, the dependent variable bij is both winning and losing bids, which 
are considered equally informative in the first-price sealed-bid format.  
 
1 2 1 2 1 ' ' ln ln           i j
TE
j j ij Y X D n b  (1) 
 
X is primarily composed of installed generation capacity in MW (GCAP), total length of 
transmission lines in km (LINE), maximum transformation capacity of erected substations in 
                                                 
12 An obvious alternative is the structural econometric estimation, such as Paarsch (1992), Guerre et al. (2000) 
and Bajari et al. (2006). However, the analysis including endogenous entry and technical considerations is not 
tractable using currently available methods, though Annex provides an illustrative example to materialize the 
structure model. Our following analysis takes a reduced form approach but is consistent with the structure 
envisaged in Annex.    - 11 -
kV (SUBS), and estimated engineering costs (COST). These variables are all logarithmic in 
the estimation models. Two dummy variables are also included: D
DAM for dam construction 
work, which normally requires additional large costs, and D
CIVIL for civil works in opposition 
to equipment supply, which may or may not be costly for contractors. Ten dummy variables 
for project countries are included as well. Yi consists of a number of bidder nationality 
dummy variables. It is likely that nationalities influence bidders’ underlying cost parameters. 
In general, local and foreign bidders would have different cost advantages and disadvantages, 
whence behaving differently in an auction. While local enterprises tend to have comparative 
advantage in labor costs, multinational companies usually have more experiences of 
development projects and are familiar with advanced technology. In the case of electricity 
projects, foreign companies may have the clear advantage because of their technological 
competence (Figure 6).  
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Source: Author’s calculation. 
 
The second equation is the number of participants n, which is determined by project-specific 
characteristics X and other exogenous variables representing the extent to which local and 
international contractors could accommodate public works. An increase in the amount of 
similar infrastructure development projects implemented in a country and the rest of the 
developing world during the past years would make prospective contractors busier, leaving 
fewer companies to bid on new works (Bajari et al., 2006). The idea is consistent with Porter 
and Zona (1993) and others (e.g., Price, 2008). In our models, specifically, Zj includes the 
amounts of energy-sector ODA projects received by each recipient country and the   - 12 -
developing world for the past three years. Two dummy variables are also potentially included 
for projects in China and projects assisted by JBIC. In China, there are a number of 
prospective firms, thus likely leading to a larger number of n, holding everything the same. 
Also, potential bidders may have different preferences to aid projects by multi- and bi-lateral 
donors.  
 
2 4 3 3 ' ' ln         j j
TE
j j Z X D n  (2) 
 
Finally, the auctioneer, namely executing agency, is supposed to decide whether to adopt the 
substantial technical evaluation system, depending on technical specifications of each project 
Xj as well as the expected degree of competition (nj).  
 
3 5 4 ' ln       j j
TE
j X n D  (3) 
 
Therefore, the system has three endogenous variables:  ,   and D
TE in three equations 
(1) to (3). 
b ln n ln
 
The data are collected from 44 procurement auctions for 21 electricity projects in 
13 countries assisted by the World Bank and a bilateral donor agency, Japan Bank for 
International Cooperation (JBIC)
13 for the period: 2000 to 2007.
14 The sample coverage is by 
no means unbiased by country; this is mainly because our sample partly comes from the 
available procurement data on large electricity projects financed by the Japanese 




                                                 
13 JBIC ODA Operations will be merged with the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) in October 
2008.  
14 All bids and engineering cost estimates are normalized to the constant 2005 U.S. dollar terms.    - 13 -
 







Albania 1 1 4
Azerbaijan 1 2 5
China 7 15 43
Egypt 1 2 8
India 1 1 3
Indonesia 1 3 3
Kenya 1 3 14
Malaysia 2 2 2
Nigeria 1 2 11
Sri Lanka 1 1 3
Tanzania 1 4 13
Uganda 1 2 3
Viet Nam 2 6 19
Total 21 44 131  
Source: Author’s calculation.  
 
As shown in Table 3, the sample contracts are also considerably heterogeneous in technical 
terms. The average installed generation capacity is 125 MW with a maximum of 1,200 MW. 
If a contract is irrelevant to generator erection, then the capacity is set at a very small but 
nonnegative number (to avoid logarithms of zero). The length of transmission lines is 
calculated by adding all installed lines, regardless of transmission capacity (kV). The length 
is about 50 km on average but ranges from several to 760 km. The capacity of substation 
equipment (including transformer, switchgear and control equipment with low voltage supply 
equipment) also varies widely between 33 kV and 500 kV. About half auctions adopted the 
substantive technical evaluation process, such as the two-envelope procedure. The average 
number of participating bidders is 5.5, but the distribution is very skewed (as seen in 
Figure 1).
15 About two-thirds are associated with civil works, rather than equipment delivery. 
In terms of engineering cost estimates some of the contracts are valued at less than one 





                                                 
15 This average is simply calculated in the sample including both winning and losing bids. On an auction basis, 
the average number of bidder is 4.7 and the median is 4.    - 14 -
Table 3. Summary Statistics  
Variable Abbr. Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Bid amount 1/ b 131 50.61 73.77 0.22 435.49
Number of bidders n 1 3 15 . 4 73 . 6 72 . 0 0 1 8 .
Dummy for technical evaluation D
TE 131 0.67 0.47 0 1
Dummy for dam contracts D
0 0
DAM 131 0.10 0.30 0 1
Dummy for civil work D
CIVIL 131 0.65 0.48 0 1
Installed generation capacity (MW) GCAP 131 125.99 284.51 0 1,200.00
Length of transmission lines (km) LINE 131 50.69 153.39 0 765.00
Max capaity of substations (kV) SUBS 131 65.46 136.48 0 500.00
Engineering cost estimate 1/ COST 131 46.93 67.80 0.36 406.61
Past transport ODA in the world 1/ WAID 131 6,980 615 6,622 9,807
Past transport ODA in each country 1/ CAID 131 413 341 15 1,339
1/ In millions of constant 2005 U.S. dollars.   
Source: Author’s calculation.  
 
Regarding additional exogenous variables Zj, two numbers are created: CAID is the amount 
of gross ODA disbursement in the energy sector that each project host country received for 
the three years before the award of a particular contract. WAID is similarly defined as the 
total ODA amount distributed to the energy sector all over the developing world. Both are in 
constant 2005 U.S. dollar terms. These are lagged variables and considered independent of 
firms’ bidding behavior in individual current auctions. But they would still likely influence 
firms’ capabilities to enter the competition. Our sample data represent only some 10 percent 
of total energy-sector ODA (Table 4). Several domestic and multinational enterprises have 
repeatedly been participating in the ODA-related infrastructure market.
16 If firms are already 
engaged in a large number of similar development projects, fewer bidders would be willing 
to bid on further works. It is also noteworthy that CAID and WAID are not invariant across 
auctions within a country, if contracts are awarded in different years. In the estimation 
models, they are in logarithm. The aid data originate from the OECD Creditor Reporting 
System database.  
 
Table 4. Total Transport-Sector ODA Projects  
(Millions of constant 2005 U.S. dollars) 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Total amount of ODA 55,112 54,580 62,207 76,362 73,935 94,407 95,286
    Of which, infrastructure 1/ 10,817 9,829 8,119 8,344 13,764 13,063 11,979
        Of which, energy 1,758 2,103 2,706 3,467 6,024 3,238 3,720
Total cost estimates of our sampled projects 294 407 328 306 632 508 29 89
1/ Including energy, water and sanitation, transport and storage, and communication.   
Source: Author’s calculation based on own data and OECD.Stat.  
                                                 
16 There is one firm which solely or jointly obtained five large contracts in our sample. Nonetheless, the market 
concentration generally appears modest. The concentration ratios of the top five firms in terms of the number of 
contracts awarded in our sample is 22 percent in electricity project procurements (Estache and Iimi, 2008c).    - 15 -
 
To estimate Equations (1) to (3) simultaneously, the conventional three-stage least squares 
estimation method (Zellner and Theil, 1962) is adopted. For computational simplicity this 
model needs to assume linearity all over the system, despite the dichotomy of D
TE. But all the 
equations can be estimated together to conclude the ultimate effects of competition, entry and 
technical considerations.  
 
In addition, several different estimation approaches are used to estimate two of the three 
equations in the system. To estimate Equations (2) and (3) together, the two-stage probit least 
squares model is applied (Maddala, 1983). Notably, D
TE is endogenous and dichotomous, 
while n is a positive number.
17 Therefore, the two-stage approach is taken where the probit 
and ordinary least squares (OLS) models are first performed for D
TE and  , respectively, 
and then the standard errors are corrected by the estimated individual variance-covariance 
matrices and a correlation between the two equation.
n ln
18 The system will explain how bidders 
make an entry decision and how the auctioneer reacts to their entry via requiring quality 
standards.  
 
To estimate Equations (1) and (2) simultaneously, the conventional instrumental variable 
technique is applied. In this case, the endogeneity of D
TE is presumed insignificant. Although 
this may not hold in the formal model as will be shown, it roughly reveals how bidders 
choose to enter into a particular type of auction, and given that, whether or not the auction is 
pro-competitive. 
 
Finally, the treatment effect model is used to estimate Equations (1) and (3), because D
TE is a 
binary endogenous choice in the equilibrium bid. This will indicate the possible impact of 
technical considerations on project procurement costs under the assumption that n is fixed.  
                                                 
17 Technically, in addition, the second endogenous variable n is typical of count data. To avoid further 
complication, however, n is treated as a continuous positive variable.  
18 To identify the system of equations, one exogenous variable, CAID, is included in the equation of D
TE at the 
second stage. Note that in the two first-stage regressions both WAID and CAID are used as instruments.    - 16 -
 
IV. ESTIMATION RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS  
 
Entry, quality and bids  
With all potential endogeneities taken into account, a three-stage least squares estimation is 
performed (Table 5). The equation of   shows that the number of bidders would be 
limited for large-scope power generation works. Possibly related to this, the technical 
evaluation process requiring non-price criteria from potential firms would restrict participants 
considerably. As will be seen in the following, limited competition would raise bids. This is 
an important anti-competitive effect of pursuing project quality. It also shows that the 
coefficients of past aid disbursements in the energy sector are both negative. It means that if 
firms are already devoted to other electricity development projects elsewhere, then fewer 
bidders could apply for new public contracts and competition will be modest. This means 
that firms are physically and financially constrained. If there are a large amount of backlogs 
in the relevant industry and if the project requires high technical standards, one cannot expect 
the large competition effect in public auctions.  
n ln
 
On the other hand, the equation of N indicates that more firms are willing to participate in 
public tenders for civil works and highly valuable contracts. Civil works can be considered 
more dependent on firm-specific cost conditions, such as labor costs, than contracts of simple 
equipment delivery. Hence, more local companies may be able to participate in the bidding 
process, particularly for distribution line works. High value contracts would also provide 
more profit opportunities for any bidders, whence inducing more firms to enter. By type of 
contract work, large power transmission and distribution line erection contracts are relatively 
easier for potential firms to enter the competition.  
 
In the equation of D
TE, the coefficient of the number of bidders is positive at 0.092 but not 
statistically significant. It means that when the expected degree of competition is limited, 
auctioneers may have an incentive to release the thresholds, but not always. In the system 
equation context, in addition, the equation of D
TE is found endogenous; the Hausman test   - 17 -
statistics is estimated at 47.9.
19 All the indications suggest that regardless of the level of 
competition, auctioneers would exogenously make their decision to adopt the substantial 
technical evaluation process. With our data, auctioneers tend to use it for civil work contracts 
and large power generation procurements. It suggests that the quality is of particular 
importance in large infrastructure projects, and auctioneers cannot easily substitute prices for 
quality even though competition is limited in such projects.  
 
Regarding the bid equation, high priority attached to technical aspects would have significant 
impacts on the equilibrium bids. The coefficient is 0.43; this is considered the pure cost of 
requiring higher quality specifications, exclusive of the indirect impact of limited 
competition stemming from high technical thresholds.
20 The endogenous impact of the 
technical evaluation is controlled in the equation of   as mentioned above, and the overall 
impact of competition is estimated at –0.56. That is, the realized competition is still a driving 
force toward lower procurement costs. The other coefficients are largely consistent with the 
above two-equation estimation results. Civil works are costly, but more applicants can be 
expected. Power generator installation is also costly, and fewer enterprises may be able to 
enter the procurement process. In addition, the technical evaluation is normally required for 
power generator works. By contrast, more bidders may participate in larger transmission and 
distribution contracts. And the coefficient of the engineering cost estimate is close to unity, 








                                                 
19 On the other hand, the number of bidders does seem to be exogenous in the equation of D
TE. The Hausman 
test statistics is –35.23, which can be interpreted as strong evidence that the exogeneity hypothesis cannot be 
rejected. 
20 Formally, the Hausman exogeneity test cannot be rejected in the bid equation. For auction participants, both n 
and D
TE seem to be exogenously given at the time of bidding.     - 18 -
Table 5. Three-Stage Least Squares Estimation of Bids, Entry and Technical Evaluation  
Estimation method Three-stage least squares
3rd stage 3rd stage 3rd stage














































R-squared 0.971 0.487 0.172
Wald chi2 4535.22 125.74 28.30
Recipient country dummy Yes China No
Bidder nationality dummy Yes No No
Donor dummy Yes Yes No
Note that the standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate 
the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.   
 
There are at least two particular remarks to interpret the estimation results correctly. First, 
our quality measurement is far from perfect. It merely captures a part of quality attributes 
related to infrastructure projects. The technical evaluation embedded in the ordinary 
infrastructure procurement process helps to ensure the contract implementation as agreed, but 
only given the main scope of the contract. Whether the project design is technically best is a 
different question that the above discussion cannot answer. This issue may have to be 
addressed by the cost benefit or least cost analysis and careful review of alternative designs 
at the much earlier stage, i.e., at the timing of project appraisal. In addition, whether the 
project was ex post implemented as contracted is also left unsolved. This also requires a 
different measure to assure the quality of projects, such as project monitoring and auditing.  
   - 19 -
Second, the analysis ignores the possible cost of auctioneers. It may be administratively 
costly for executing agencies to divide a project into a number of small lots and coordinate 
them. Notably, however, recent rapid developments in information and communication 
technology (ICT) allow to reduce administrative costs of public procurement dramatically 
through e-procurement or e-government. Along with all these complementary institutions, 
auctioneers could pursue more competition and better quality simultaneously in infrastructure 
procurement.  
 
Entry and quality  
When the bidder entry equation is estimated simultaneously with the auctioneer’s decision on 
whether to adopt the substantial technical evaluation, it is found that auctioneers are more 
likely to use such a mechanism as the number of participants increases (Table 6). In addition, 
the hypothesis that this quality standard decision is exogenous can be rejected according to 
the Hausman exogeneity test, for which the chi-squared test statistics is estimated at 16.44. 
This result is not compatible with the above three-equation system estimation. But it is 
interesting to interpret the result, because it means that auctioneers would react to enhanced 
competition by increasing greater emphasis on quality aspects. Conversely, if the number of 
bidders is limited, auctioneers would not impose too severe quality requirements. Without 
doubt, however, this compromise would result in the worst-case scenario; limited 
competition will raise procurement costs, and project quality may not be able to be ensured.  
 
The two-stage probit least squares model also shows that auctioneers may prefer to adopt the 
technical evaluation systems for procuring larger electricity generators and civil works. 
Regarding bidders’ entry decision, the first-stage regression indicates that the number of 
bidders in equilibrium seems to decrease with the installed generator capacity and the 
volumes of past foreign aid in the energy sector. Large power generation projects could 
attract fewer bidders possibly due to technical difficulties, and the number of expected 
participants would be small when potential contractors are already engaged in other 
electricity development projects. However, the statistical significance of these coefficients 
appears weak in the second stage regression where D
TE is treated as potential endogenous,   - 20 -
although the exogeneity hypothesis of D
TE cannot be rejected formally by the Hausman test 
(the test statistics is negative). The impact of adopted technical evaluation systems is also far 
from significant; the coefficient is positive (0.162).  
 
Table 6. Two-Stage Probit Least Squares Model for Entry and Technical Evaluation  
Estimation method Two-stage probit least squares
1st stage 1st stage 2nd stage 2nd stage










DAM –0.170 –0.666 –0.062 –0.039
















(0.005) (0.019) (0.012) (0.023)
ln SUBS 0.005 0.044
** –0.002 0.026
(0.005) (0.020) (0.041) (0.022)
lnCOST 0.110
*** –0.205 0.144 –0.613
***











(5.124) (21.465) (12.225) (1.277)
Obs. 131 131 131
R-squared 0.462
F-statistics 10.30
LR chi2 64.17 49.83
Recipient country dummy China China China No
Bidder nationality dummy No No No No
Donor dummy Yes No Yes No
Note that the standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate the 
10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.   
 
Entry and bids  
The instrumental variable model where the equilibrium bid function is estimated with the 
number of bidders n instrumented shows more results on the bidder entry preferences. The 
first stage regression on   indicates that fewer bidders would participate in the auctions 
for dam construction, and civil works and more valuable contracts could attract more 
participants (Table 7). Large-scale power transmission and distribution projects look more 
attractive for potential contractors, but there is no significant evidence that larger generation 
and substation works could have more bidders. This is consistent with the above two-stage 
n ln  - 21 -
probit least squares model. It can be interpreted as the particular significance of economies of 
scale in transmission and distribution works.
21 With the technical evaluation process 
introduced, fewer firms seem to be allowed to enter; the coefficient of D
TE is negative but not 
statistically significant.  
 
Regarding the impact on the equilibrium bid, the second stage regression reveals that more 
competition leads to lower procurement costs as expected. However, the exogeneity of n may 
not be able to be rejected at the conventional significance level. The Hausman exogeneity 
test statistics is estimated at 0.14. Besides n, Table 6 shows that larger projects, especially in 
terms of generation and substation capacities, would be more costly. The equilibrium bid 
would also be higher if bidders are supposed to be assessed technically before the price 
comparison. This follows natural expectations. It is worth recalling that in this instrumental 
variable estimation, another potential simultaneous equation associated with auctioneer’s 
technical consideration decision is ignored.  
 
Quality and bids  
The treatment effect model more clearly highlights the possible effect of involving technical 
thresholds on the equilibrium bid. D
TE is treated as potentially endogenous in the equation of 
. It is confirmed that auctioneers would prefer to place more emphasis on technical 
assessment for large electricity generation and substation projects.
b ln
22 And this quality 
consideration will bring about additional procurement costs; the coefficient of D
TE is 
estimated at 0.709, which is significantly different from zero. In this estimation model, 
however, D
TE may be exogenous, because the Hausman exogeneity test statistics is rather 
low at 0.60. Therefore, at the entry decision stage, the technical standard adoption may be 
endogenous (as shown above), but the price bidding stage, the technical requirements are 
give to potential bidders, and they would likely reflect extra costs on their price bids. Notably, 
                                                 
21 See Estache and Iimi (2008a) for more detailed discussion on potential economies of scale in infrastructure 
procurements.  
22 The dummy variables for dam and civil works are excluded for convergence purposes. However, the main 
results have been found unchanged even if the system is estimated by the two-stage estimation technique.    - 22 -
the equilibrium bid function still looks pro-competitive with respect to n; more bidders lead 
to lower procurement costs.  
 
Table 7. IV and Treatment Effect Regressions on Bids  
Estimation method 2SLS Treatment effect
1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage





















ln GCAP 0.001 0.008
** 0.049
*** 0.005
(0.006) (0.004) (0.014) (0.004)
ln LINE 0.030
*** 0.002 –0.006 –0.0004
(0.005) (0.008) (0.016) (0.004)




















(19.369) (0.328) (0.609) (0.301)
Obs. 131 131 131 131
R-squared 0.713 0.972
F-statistics 6.48
Wald chi2 4536.80 4014.84
Recipient country dummy Yes Yes No Yes
Bidder nationality dummy Yes Yes No Yes
Donor dummy Yes Yes No Yes
ρ –0.521
(0.316)
LR test statistics: ρ=0 0.70
Note that the standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate the 10%, 
5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.   
 
 
V. CONCLUSION  
 
Infrastructure procurement is a challenging task for governments. Infrastructure projects are 
often technically complicated and highly customized. Because potential bidders that are 
competent for large-scale infrastructure works are relatively limited, procurement   - 23 -
competition tends to be limited. Electricity projects are typical. In most cases of our sample, 
only two or three bidders participated in each auction.  
 
Without doubt competition is the most important factor toward efficiency and anti-corruption. 
However, the degree of competition that one can expect is closely related to bidders’ entry 
decision and auctioneer’s decision on how to assess non-price (technical) attributes in the bid 
evaluation process. The current paper casts light on the potential interactive effects among 
quality, entry and competition, by estimating the system of simultaneous equations with data 
on procurement auctions for large electricity projects in developing countries.  
 
It is found that the decision to adopt the technical evaluation method is endogenously made 
while potential contractors are considering whether they would enter the auction process. If 
certain technical aspects are taken into consideration regardless of prices, the equilibrium 
bids would increase significantly due to extra costs required to meet higher quality standards. 
In addition, high technical requirements would reduce the number of participants. When the 
expected competition is going to be limited, auctioneers may have an incentive to loosen the 
thresholds. But this feedback is found insignificant because the quality is of particular 
importance in large-scale infrastructure projects. In general, technically large electricity 
projects are not only costly by nature but also can attract only a few potential bidders, 
resulting in less efficiency. Moreover, the technical requirements are more likely to be 
imposed on large projects so that bidder participation would be even more limited. This is the 
revealed underlying mechanism for limited competition in procurement auctions for large 
electricity projects.    - 24 -
ANNEX. AN EXAMPLE OF AUCTION WITH ENDOGENOUS ENTRY AND QUALITY THRESHOLD  
 
A simple government procurement auction with a predetermined quality threshold is 
considered under the independent private value paradigm. A three-stage sealed-bid first-price 
format is assumed: bidders’ entry decision, auctioneer’s quality threshold selection, and 
conventional competitive bidding. Suppose that given a private cost parameter    H L i    , 
)
, 
which is distributed according to a density probability distribution function  ( f , each 
bidder is requested to submit price bid bi and quality qi simultaneously. They do not directly 
care about quality (meaning that a higher quality of project does not increase bidder profits), 



















. It means that quality is quite expensive; bidders’ procurement costs 
increase with quality in a convex fashion. Bidders, once entering the selection process, have 
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where ξ is the quality threshold.  
 
A solution is characterized through a backward step. At the bidding stage, a symmetric 
equilibrium bid function is:  
 
 
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This is merely a variation of Che’s (1993) model but includes a positive entry cost k. Note 
that πH is basically composed of k and the profit guaranteed to a bidder with the highest   - 25 -
possible cost parameter. Because quality is costly for bidders, the equilibrium quality bid 
must be set at the minimum requirement,    i q .  
 
Given this symmetric equilibrium, the auctioneer is supposed to maximize its expected profit 
with respect to quality and select the optimal threshold ξ
*:  
 
       q b E q V j j j
q
, min max arg
*      
 













; the quality is valuable but in a concave fashion. And the auctioneer contracts out 
the project at the (expected) lowest bid.  
 
Finally, at the beginning of the game, bidders are assumed to enter as long as their expected 
profits are nonnegative (McAfee and McMillan, 1987). Before observing his cost parameter, 
the ex ante expected profit from entry for any bidder is:  
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This must be equal to k. Hence, the optimal number of participants n
* satisfies the following:  
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For illustrative purposes, a numerical example is considered and several comparative static 
effects are investigated to see the equilibrium behavior in terms of entry and quality threshold. 
Assume that θ is uniformly distributed from zero to unity. And assume the following   - 26 -
functional forms:   
2 ,
i q q c i i i     and   
2 1 q q V  . Moreover,  0  H   for simplicity. Then, the 




























Hence, no bidder reveals his true cost as usual, and their price bids are inflated by the quality 
factor. As competition increases, their bids would approach their true costs (as often called 
the competition effect).  
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Therefore, given n, the auctioneer maximizes its expected profit with respect to the quality 



























With well-behaved functional forms assumed (as mentioned above), the optimal q is strictly 
positive, meaning that the auctioneer always prefers to set a certain quality threshold  . 
In addition, the auctioneer would raise the threshold as the number of participating bidders 
0
*    - 27 -
increases. This is essentially because price and quality are both desirable and substitutable for 
the auctioneer. Intense competition would bring down the equilibrium bid as shown above. 
Hence, quality tends to become relatively more valuable for auctioneer, and she might raise 
the threshold. The total effect on the equilibrium price will be indeterminate, because there is 
a clear tradeoff between strengthened competition and higher quality requirements.  
 




















; higher entry costs would reduce the optimal number of bidders.  
 
A practical implication is straightforward: Suppose that for some exogenous reason (for 
example, through introducing e-procurement) the entry cost for potential bidders declines. 
Then, more bidders would likely decide to participate in the procurement process. Intensified 
competition would lead to lower bid prices. However, the auctioneer who lays great 
emphasis on quality (in addition to prices) may desire to raise the required quality threshold, 
for example through tightening the prequalification and technical evaluation systems. Higher 
quality requirements would add additional costs on individual bid prices. Accordingly, the 
equilibrium bid, or the expected public procurement costs may or may not decrease with 
entry costs alone. It must be of necessity dependent on various factors, such as bidders’ cost 
structure including quality aspects, and the extent to which the quality matters to the 
auctioneer, or more precisely the public in the government procurement case.  
   - 28 -
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